What do boards really want from the Company Secretary?
What do boards really want from the Company Secretary?
David Cantrick-Brooks | 01/05/2025

We all know and recognise that the role of the company secretary has changed over time, and has moved from just being the keeper of corporate records and minute taker, to becoming the chief governance officer, with all of the additional responsibilities and intersections with other executives that entails (whilst still doing the basics, now in a highly digital environment, which requires a bunch of new skills in itself!).

In this modern era of changing roles and skillsets it would be very interesting to know … “what do boards really want from the company secretary?” [NB Just the CoSec role, not dual roles.]

It could be (for example*):

* These examples are neither exhaustive nor necessarily mutually exclusive. It should also be noted that these examples are not intended to suggest that the company secretary would not work co-operatively and collaboratively with management or create an adversarial situation – although recognising that robust conversations may take place from time to time. Prevailing circumstances will also clearly have an impact on what the board wants from the secretary.

There is also a view among many directors that part of the role of the company secretary is to help keep them ‘out of trouble’, including by assisting them in complying with their director’s duties (in various ways – e.g. providing reminders and regulatory updates).

Not surprisingly, the preferred model or standard of governance1 (plastic, bronze, silver, gold, platinum) chosen by the board will be a very significant factor in determining what the board wants from the company secretary.

In addition, it should be noted that reporting lines (e.g. to the chair and/or CEO, or to another senior executive) will often have a major bearing on what the company secretary does day-to-day, noting that some chairs are very active in relation to corporate governance – particularly where they want to adopt things successfully used in outside organisations. Personalities of individuals are another significant influence.

Side Note

In recent times, we have also witnessed the emergence of the additional requirement for the possession of a strong working knowledge and skills in the IT-based systems which facilitate company secretarial practice (such as entity management, document lodgement platforms, meeting management, board portals, online meeting platforms, and online surveys). Query what changes (in terms of expectations) will attend this seismic shift in capability / practice.

1 The desired model of governance drives the organisation’s choices of governance systems, policies and procedures, etc., and the workload and expectations of the company secretary. The terms ‘light touch’ and ‘gold standard’ are often used for the two ends of the governance continuum.

General Disclaimer:

The information contained in this website is provided for informational purposes only and should not be construed as legal advice on any matter.

No person(s) should act, or refrain from acting, solely on the basis of the material contained on this website. Your access of this website, and any use that you may make of the information on it, is not intended to create, and your use does not constitute, a contractual relationship of any kind.

All material published by Governance in Action Pty Ltd on its website remains its property, with copyright attached, and all rights are reserved.

PreviousNext

Related Articles

Tranche 2 AML/CTF: An Early Temperature Check for Professional Service Providers

Australia’s Tranche 2 AML/CTF reforms moved into live operation on 1 July 2026. One month later, the evidence is not strong enough for a verdict - but it is sufficient to identify the questions that matter. This article explains why scope mapping remains the first control, clarifies the significance of the 29 July enrolment deadline, and examines the shift from having policies and templates to operating an effective AML/CTF framework. It also considers the position of governance and company secretarial providers, the need to integrate customer due diligence into ordinary workflows, the interaction between recordkeeping and privacy, and the responsibilities of governing bodies, senior managers and compliance officers. The central lesson is that commencement readiness is not completion: the next phase is to test, evidence and improve how the program works in live engagements.

08/02/2026

APRA’s proposed recast CPS 510: What changes, what matters and how boards should prepare

APRA’s proposed recast CPS 510 Governance is more than a technical consolidation. It would combine five prudential standards into one cross-industry framework and impose clearer, more evidence-based expectations for board accountability, delegation, management information, skills, performance, renewal, conflicts and fitness and propriety. The most consequential proposals include a mandatory measurable board skills matrix, an independent external board review every three years for significant financial institutions, and a 12-year maximum tenure for non-executive directors. The draft also creates sharper requirements for group-board independence and board information, while reducing routine fit-and-proper reporting through alignment with the Financial Accountability Regime. This article explains the key changes, contrasts them with the draft 5th edition of the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations, and sets out a practical implementation agenda for boards, company secretaries and governance advisers. Although commencement is expected in early 2028, long-lead matters such as director succession, committee composition, constitutions, charters and systems should be identified well before the final standard takes effect.

08/01/2026

Forty Years of Director and Officer Penalties in Australia: What the Evidence Really Shows

Australia’s corporate-enforcement system has changed substantially over the four financial decades to 30 June 2026. Civil-enforcement activity and statutory penalty ceilings have increased, and recent cases demonstrate that directors and senior officers can face substantial personal penalties, lengthy disqualification and costs exposure. Yet the available public data does not prove that the underlying rate of serious misconduct has risen—or that higher financial penalties alone deter it. Headline ASIC totals are dominated by penalties imposed on companies, while director-specific research shows that disqualification and imprisonment have historically been central to individual accountability. This article separates what the evidence establishes from what remains uncertain, examines the impact of the 2019 penalty reforms, and identifies the practical lessons for boards, governance professionals and regulators.

07/29/2026